Estimated shares outstanding (market cap / price) = ~2.43B shares (32.33B / 13.32). Using that share count, reported FY2024 net income of $1.54B implies an EPS near $0.63 for the fiscal year (small variance vs other EPS figures reported in the dataset). The market P/E using the quoted price and EPS lines up with the provided P/E of ~22.6x.
Net debt / EBITDA (FY2024) = 26.20B / 3.09B = 8.48x. That is materially higher than the dataset’s TTM net-debt-to-EBITDA field (which reports a negative number). The 8.5x figure signals significant project lever-up relative to current consolidated EBITDA.
Enterprise value (EV) = market cap + total debt - cash = 32.33B + 29.81B - 3.61B = 58.53B. EV / FY2024 EBITDA = 58.53B / 3.09B = 18.94x. This is substantially different from the provided EV/EBITDA figure of 8.5x in the dataset; the discrepancy stems from inconsistent inputs in the pre-calculated fields.
Current ratio (FY2024) = total current assets / total current liabilities = 4.56B / 3.54B = 1.29x.
Debt to equity (FY2024) = total debt / total stockholders’ equity = 29.81B / 2.90B = 10.28x. That indicates a very high leverage multiple when measured against reported equity on the consolidated balance sheet.
CapEx to revenue (FY2024) = 13.72B / 4.97B = 276%, illustrating the asymmetric relationship between operating cash generation and ongoing investment needs.
Free cash flow margin (FY2024) = -11.57B / 4.97B = -232.8%, showing that corporate free cash flow is deeply negative while the company invests to scale.

These reconciled numbers point to a company that is profitable at the operating level but intentionally becoming much more levered to finance a rapid capacity build.

Income statement and balance-sheet snapshots (FY2022–FY2024)#

Income statement summary (selected line items)#

Fiscal year	Revenue (USD)	Gross profit (USD)	EBITDA (USD)	Operating income (USD)	Net income (USD)	Gross margin
2024	4,970,000,000	3,300,000,000	3,090,000,000	1,760,000,000	1,540,000,000	66.35%
2023	7,900,000,000	6,210,000,000	5,350,000,000	4,850,000,000	2,680,000,000	78.68%
2022	6,450,000,000	4,200,000,000	4,290,000,000	3,560,000,000	1,860,000,000	65.09%

These numbers underline two themes: first, Venture Global’s per-unit economics on LNG sales are high (gross margins in the 60s–70s). Second, revenue and EBITDA moved lower in 2024 relative to 2023, driven by timing, commissioning and the company’s commercial schedule.

Balance sheet summary (selected line items)#

Fiscal year	Cash & equivalents (USD)	Total assets (USD)	Total debt (USD)	Net debt (USD)	Equity (USD)
2024	3,610,000,000	43,490,000,000	29,810,000,000	26,200,000,000	2,900,000,000
2023	4,820,000,000	28,460,000,000	21,170,000,000	16,340,000,000	1,510,000,000
2022	618,000,000	15,100,000,000	10,950,000,000	10,330,000,000	-186,000,000

From 2023 to 2024, total assets rose by roughly +52.8% and long-term debt increased by about +41%. Those balance-sheet moves are consistent with the company capitalizing large CP2-related assets and drawing project and sponsor financing ahead of ramping production.

Why the two recent corporate events matter (and how they connect to the numbers)#

The two events that reset investor focus are the July 2025 close of $15.1B in project financing for CP2 Phase 1 and an August 2025 arbitration ruling that removed a potential counterparty claim of up to $1.6B. Both are concrete de-risking outcomes, but each operates on a different axis of company risk: financing solves near-term funding and bankability; the arbitration removes legal overhang and potential cash outflow.

The CP2 financing matters because it moves a substantial portion of project-level debt into non-recourse project vehicles. That means the corporate entity can, in theory, avoid carrying the full economic burden of the entire CP2 draw on its general balance sheet, provided project covenants and intercompany guarantees remain contained. In practice, however, some sponsor-level support and liquidity backstops usually persist during construction; the FY2024 consolidated balance sheet nevertheless reflects a significant step-up in project-related capitalization and associated debt as lenders and EPC contractors mobilized.

The arbitration result matters because it eliminates an explicit downside scenario sized at $1.6B that had been priced into investor expectations and litigation modeling. Removing that contingent liability improves both headline solvency and — importantly — counterparty confidence for future SPA negotiations.

The central strategic thesis: rapid scale via modular builds, but execution and regulatory risks are priced in#

Venture Global’s strategy is straightforward: use factory-built modular liquefaction trains and an integrated pipeline to drive down per-ton capital costs and compress construction schedules. The company’s financials show the early stages of that strategy being funded at scale. High gross margins on existing volumes demonstrate the underlying commercial economics are attractive when projects are operational. The $15.1B CP2 financing is a vote of confidence from international banks that the project’s contract and cash-flow structure are bankable at scale.

But three critical frictions remain. First, execution risk: modular construction reduces some on-site schedule exposure, but large-scale assembly, transportation and commissioning complexity still create potential delays and cost overruns. Second, regulatory and permitting risk: federal and state permitting, supplemental environmental reviews and politically driven scrutiny can produce timing friction or added mitigation costs that influence draw schedules and interest cover. Third, market risk: a sizeable global LNG supply build through the late 2020s could compress prices, particularly if a large share of new capacity is delivered on time and index or spot-linked pricing remains prevalent.

These frictions are exactly the ones that financing and arbitration outcomes address partially but not completely; financing reduces capital risk while the arbitration reduces legal tail risk. Both make the growth pathway more credible, but they do not eliminate operational, regulatory or market execution risk.

Quality of earnings and cash flow dynamics#

Reported operating margins and gross margins are robust, but the quality of reported earnings must be evaluated alongside cash metrics. FY2024 operating cash flow was $2.15B, down -52.8% year over year, while capex surged to $13.72B. That combination produces the negative free cash flow described earlier. From an earnings-quality perspective, net income in 2024 remains positive and sizable, which suggests underlying contracts and pricing are delivering margin. However, transformational capex means the company’s free-cash generation is negative until newly financed trains start producing and their cash flows are recycled to debt service.

In short: earnings quality at the operating line looks durable; corporate free cash flow is structurally negative in the near term because of deliberate investment.

Data inconsistencies and how we prioritized inputs#

The source dataset included pre-computed TTM ratios that conflict with base-line fiscal numbers (examples: EV/EBITDA 8.5x vs our calculated 18.94x; net-debt-to-EBITDA reported as negative vs our computed 8.48x). Where conflicts existed, I prioritized the raw FY2024 income statement, balance sheet and cash flow line items and the market-cap figure to recalculate leverage and valuation metrics. Those raw-line interpretations are the most auditable inputs for debt, cash and asset values; pre-computed ratios can be driven by alternate definitions (different EBITDA windows, pro-forma adjustments, or off-balance financing) that were not documented in the dataset. I flag these discrepancies as evidence that third-party ratio fields should be validated before being used in model outputs.

What this means for investors (no recommendation)#

Investors focused on credit and liquidity will see clearly different implications than those focused on operating growth. From a credit standpoint, the consolidated balance sheet shows very high leverage relative to reported equity and FY2024 EBITDA, and corporate free cash flow will remain constrained until new trains begin producing. From an operational-growth standpoint, the CP2 financing and the arbitration ruling materially reduce the two largest near-term execution and legal overhangs and improve the plausibility of rapid scale-up to the mid-decade production targets discussed by management.

Consolidating those views, the key implications are: first, Venture Global now has the project funding to pursue its next wave of capacity, which should support contract monetization and long-term revenue growth if commissioning follows plan. Second, the company is more sensitive to schedule slippage or permitting delays than peers with steadier cash flows; cost inflation or regulatory delays would compress near-term cash coverage ratios. Third, legal and counterparty overhangs have been meaningfully reduced — the arbitration outcome removes a large headline risk that was previously constraining sentiment.

Key catalysts and watch points#

Investors and counterparties should monitor three categories of developments closely. The first is execution milestones for CP2 Phase 1: module delivery, pipeline completion, and commissioning targets for 2027. The second is permitting and regulatory progress — especially any supplemental EIS outcomes or material conditions that could alter draw schedules. The third is commercial: additional SPA signings, cargo deliveries and any change in contract pricing mechanisms that would change realized margins when CP2 comes online.

Principal risks#

Regulatory delays, construction cost overruns, and an unexpectedly weak spot market (or long-term price resets) remain the primary downside risks. Additionally, while the arbitration win removes a specific liability, ongoing shareholder litigation and disclosure suits tied to the 2025 IPO remain unresolved and could create reputational and transactional friction.

Concluding synthesis#

Venture Global sits at a pivotal scaling junction. The $15.1B CP2 project financing materially advances the company’s plan to expand output via modular trains, while the arbitration ruling that removed a potential $1.6B liability eliminates a major legal overhang. Those events combined convert previously theoretical growth into an actionable balance-sheet program. Yet the financials show a company that is deeply capital-intensive in the near term: FY2024 capex of $13.72B, net debt of $26.20B, and free cash flow of -$11.57B indicate that converting capacity into sustainable corporate cash generation is the critical next chapter.

If modular execution, permitting and SPA commercialization proceed on schedule, the company’s operating margins and contracted volumes provide the economic levers to service project-level debt and rebuild corporate free cash flow over time. If execution slips or market prices weaken, the elevated leverage profile will amplify pressure on cash coverage. The most useful way to watch Venture Global over the next 12–24 months is therefore to track discrete, verifiable milestones — module deliveries, pipeline commissioning, regulatory clearances and the first cargoes from CP2 — because those events will translate directly into the cash flows that determine whether this aggressive, modular build strategy produces durable economics at scale.