Free cash flow (FCF) for FY2024 totaled $3.20 billion, down from $3.81 billion in FY2023 — a decline of -16.01%, principally because of a combination of higher working capital outflows (change in working capital of -584MM) and continued capital spending to scale yard capacity. Operating cash flow fell to $4.11 billion in FY2024 from $4.71 billion in FY2023, a change of -12.72%. The company continues to convert accounting earnings into substantial cash, but the 2024 step‑down in operating and free cash flow highlights how scaling production (and absorbing long‑lead buys) temporarily tightens liquidity conversion.
According to GD’s FY2024 filings and subsequent quarterly commentary, the company’s EBITDA for FY2024 was $5.82 billion, which yields a net‑debt-to‑EBITDA metric (using year‑end net debt of $8.98 billion) of roughly 1.54x — a conservative leverage posture that supports continued capital allocation flexibility while the Marine Systems ramp proceeds. GD ended FY2024 with $1.70 billion of cash and equivalents and $10.68 billion total debt, giving a current ratio of 1.37x (total current assets $24.39 billion / current liabilities $17.82 billion), consistent with an investment‑grade intermediate liquidity profile.
(Reference: FY2024 consolidated financials and related filings) Vertex AI Search Redirect - Q4 Primary Source
Financial trends in context: three-year growth and margin patterns#
Looking at the 2021–2024 series, revenue grew from $38.47B (2021) to $47.72B (2024). That implies a three‑year compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of roughly +7.48%, demonstrating steady, program‑driven expansion anchored by shipbuilding and services businesses. Net income moved from $3.26B (2021) to $3.78B (2024), a more muted three‑year trajectory (3‑yr CAGR ~ +5.1%) because profits are affected by product mix, ramp timing and periodic adjustments.
Margins show a stable, if compressed, profile: gross margins have ranged in the mid‑teens (FY2024 15.43% vs FY2023 15.78%), operating margins around ~10% (FY2024 10.06%), and net margins near 7.9%. Those are typical ranges for a diversified defense contractor mixing heavy industrial shipbuilding (lower margin, capital intensive) with higher‑margin mission‑systems and services businesses.
Income statement trend (FY2021–FY2024)#
| Year |
Revenue (USD) |
Operating Income (USD) |
Net Income (USD) |
Operating Margin |
| 2024 |
47,720,000,000 |
4,800,000,000 |
3,780,000,000 |
10.06% |
| 2023 |
42,270,000,000 |
4,250,000,000 |
3,310,000,000 |
10.05% |
| 2022 |
39,410,000,000 |
4,210,000,000 |
3,390,000,000 |
10.69% |
| 2021 |
38,470,000,000 |
4,160,000,000 |
3,260,000,000 |
10.82% |
(Income statement values from company financials filed for each fiscal year) Vertex AI Search Redirect - Q4 Primary Source
Balance sheet & cash flow snapshot (FY2021–FY2024)#
| Year |
Cash & Equivalents |
Total Assets |
Total Debt |
Net Debt |
Free Cash Flow |
Dividends Paid |
| 2024 |
1,700,000,000 |
55,880,000,000 |
10,680,000,000 |
8,980,000,000 |
3,200,000,000 |
1,530,000,000 |
| 2023 |
1,910,000,000 |
54,810,000,000 |
11,080,000,000 |
9,170,000,000 |
3,810,000,000 |
1,430,000,000 |
| 2022 |
1,240,000,000 |
51,590,000,000 |
12,110,000,000 |
10,870,000,000 |
3,460,000,000 |
1,370,000,000 |
| 2021 |
1,600,000,000 |
50,070,000,000 |
13,180,000,000 |
11,570,000,000 |
3,380,000,000 |
1,310,000,000 |
(Balance sheet and cash flow figures from company financial statements) Vertex AI Search Redirect - Q4 Primary Source
The Marine Systems story: backlog scale, production ramps and the submarine monopoly#
The strategic core of GD’s long‑duration revenue story is its Marine Systems unit — primarily Electric Boat (nuclear submarines) and Bath Iron Works (surface combatants). Management reported a company backlog of $103.7 billion and disclosed that Marine Systems represented approximately $53 billion of that total in Q2 2025, producing a book‑to‑bill of roughly 2.2:1 for the quarter. Those figures are the proximate cause of the revenue runway that underpins the company’s multi‑year guidance and the reason GD is seen as structurally advantaged in U.S. naval shipbuilding.
Electric Boat has unique strategic positioning as the U.S. builder of nuclear submarines, driving both the Virginia‑class attack submarine cadence and ramping Columbia‑class SSBN production. The Columbia program — a decades‑long, capital‑heavy enterprise — requires significant long‑lead purchases and yard investments that depress margins in the near term but create durable, politically supported demand. Bath Iron Works complements Electric Boat with surface combatant work including DDG‑51 Arleigh Burke‑class destroyers, giving the company exposure across high‑priority naval platforms.
(Backlog and Marine Systems metrics drawn from Q2 commentary and earnings materials) Vertex AI Search Redirect - Q2 Primary Source
Margin dynamics: why backlog doesn't equal near‑term margin expansion#
The central margin story for GD is that secured backlog and rising volumes do not instantly translate into steady margin expansion. The company reported a sequential margin headwind in Q2 2025 tied to an "extremely unusual" EAC adjustment at the NASCO joint venture, producing a short‑term operating margin decline for Marine Systems. Management’s guidance centers on a mid‑single‑digit (near 7%) operating margin for Marine Systems in 2025 with an expectation of improvement as Columbia and Virginia programs reach steady‑state efficiencies and learning‑curve benefits occur.
Two structural forces compress margins during scale‑up phases: first, long‑lead materials and preproduction costs are front‑loaded and hit the P&L before revenue recognition catches up; second, workforce hiring and supplier capacity investments raise operating expenses in the near term. Both forces were visible in FY2024 results through increased operating expenses and working capital drawdowns tied to yard build activity. The implication is straightforward: investors should expect lumpy, program‑specific margin swings even as structural margin expansion remains the mid‑term objective.
Competitive dynamics: a narrow but deep moat versus HII and others#
In the U.S. shipbuilding universe, General Dynamics occupies a narrow but deep moat around nuclear submarine construction via Electric Boat; that monopoly on nuclear hull production is a fundamental barrier to entry. Competitor Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) retains dominance in carriers and large amphibious ships and competes with GD’s Bath Iron Works on DDG‑51 destroyer production. The two firms therefore address different portfolio segments of U.S. naval procurement, reducing direct platform overlap while leaving capacity and yard productivity as the principal axes of competition.
Production capacity constraints, supplier readiness and yard productivity are the key competitive battlegrounds. GD’s investments in yard productivity, workforce development and supplier onshoring are aimed at lowering unit costs as volumes rise. The company’s ability to convert backlog into profitable revenue depends on delivering productivity improvements without material program overruns — a capability that has shown progress but remains execution‑sensitive.
(Competitive context from industry program awards and company disclosures) Vertex AI Search Redirect - Q2 Primary Source
Capital allocation: dividends, buybacks and balance‑sheet posture#
GD maintains a steady cash return profile: in FY2024 the company paid $1.53 billion in dividends and repurchased about $1.50 billion of common stock, demonstrating a balanced approach between shareholder returns and reinvestment in the industrial base. Dividends paid in 2024 represented roughly 40.48% of FY2024 net income (dividends paid $1.53B / net income $3.78B) while buybacks were a similar magnitude. This level of cash deployment is consistent with a company that is both capital‑intensive and committed to returning cash when excess liquidity exists.
GD’s net debt position — roughly $8.98 billion at year‑end 2024 — and a net‑debt-to‑EBITDA of about 1.54x provide room to fund yard investments and to sustain dividends and opportunistic buybacks while remaining within a conservative leverage envelope. Capital expenditures were $916 million in FY2024 (about 1.92% of revenue), roughly matching depreciation, indicating continued reinvestment but not an aggressive capex expansion outside yard needs.
Forward signals and analyst estimates: growth out to 2029#
Analyst estimates embedded in available projections point to continued revenue growth through the latter half of the decade, with consensus estimates (company‑compiled analyst medians) forecasting revenue of ~$51.19 billion and EPS of ~15.20 in 2025, rising toward ~$59.19 billion revenue and EPS ~21.40 by 2029. Forward multiples included in the company data show a 2025 forward P/E near 20.43x, moving lower in later years as earnings scale. These projections assume steady program execution and successful productivity gains across Marine Systems and Mission Systems, and they reflect a normalization of margins as production reaches steady state.
(Analyst estimate series and forward metric references) Vertex AI Search Redirect - Q5 Primary Source
What this means for investors#
GD’s business profile is bifurcated: one leg is a durable, politically backed backlog anchored in submarine production that provides multi‑year revenue visibility; the other leg is the operational challenge of converting that backlog into consistently improving margins while funding yard upgrades and working capital needs. The company’s liquidity and leverage metrics provide flexibility to execute the ramp, while dividends and share repurchases remain material uses of cash. Investors should therefore view GD’s current performance through the lens of program sequencing: revenue and backlog are structural positives, but near‑term margin volatility related to EAC adjustments, ramp costs and working capital swings is an operational reality.
Key takeaways#
General Dynamics sits on a record backlog (~$103.7B) with Marine Systems ~ $53B, creating a long horizon of secured work. This backlog is the strategic bedrock of future revenue and underpins management guidance.
Near‑term margins are under pressure because of ramp‑related costs and a discrete EAC adjustment; management expects margin expansion as programs mature and productivity improvements take hold, but the path will be lumpy.
Cash flow remains strong even as free cash flow dipped in FY2024 (-16.01%) due to working capital and production investments; net debt to EBITDA (~1.54x) keeps financial flexibility intact for continued capex and shareholder returns.
Capital allocation is balanced: dividends and buybacks were each roughly $1.5B in FY2024, with dividend payouts in the 38–40% range of earnings depending on whether TTM or fiscal year measures are used.
Conclusion: secured scale, execution risk, and a multi‑year story#
GD’s narrative is one of secured scale and execution sensitivity. The company’s backlog and program awards place it at the center of U.S. naval modernization for the next decade, providing predictable, long‑dated revenue. That scale, however, comes with execution demands: yard productivity, supplier readiness and disciplined contract accounting will determine whether the multi‑year build converts into steady margin expansion. From a financial‑strategic standpoint, GD is not a short‑cycle growth story but rather an industrial‑scale program operator whose investment thesis rests on execution against complex, politically sustained programs. The data show a business with strong cash generation, conservative leverage, and a capital allocation pattern that balances shareholder returns with the reinvestment required to win and sustain submarine and surface combatant production.
(Selected source materials: company fiscal filings and quarterly commentary) Vertex AI Search Redirect - Q4 Primary Source Vertex AI Search Redirect - Q2 Primary Source